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from investing in several different countries. We find that investments react to carbon
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ABSTRACT
This paper empirically investigates the effect of the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
on cross-country investments. To avoid carbon leakage, the scheme allocates a number of free
allowances to firms at risk of relocating investments in areas outside the EU ETS. To study this
problem, we employ a model of the firm’s investment decision in conjunction with novel firm-level
data. In contrast with most previous literature, we stress the importance of firms’ heterogeneity in
the analysis and leverage it. We derive conditions for the firm’s optimal emissions to construct a
measure of investment sensitivity to carbon pricing from observed pollution data. This allows to
identify the effect of the EU ETS on international investments by comparing the expected profits
from investing in several different countries. We find that investments react to carbon pricing and
that the effect is stronger for more polluting investments. However, the aggregate amount of
diverted investments is small. We moreover show that the lost investments do not justify, alone,
the generous compensations scheme aimed at retaining investments.
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Environmental Policy and Investment Location: The Risk of
Carbon Leakage in the EU ETS
1. Introduction
The Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a cornerstone of the EU's policy to combat climate
change and its key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively. Capping the
emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons from over 11 000 heavy
energy-using and electricity generating installations and aircraft, covering about 45% of the
EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it is the world's first major carbon market and remains
the biggest one.
At the beginning of 2021 in the midst of the pandemic crisis, the EU ETS has entered its fourth
trading period (Phase IV, from 2021 to 2030) under a newly revised legislation. The rules
governing the allocation of emission allowances are a fundamental component of the system’s
regulation, which has changed significantly across the trading periods as part of wider
reforms.
Asymmetric climate action across jurisdictions raises a problem of protecting domestic
producers from competitiveness loss due to higher production-cum-carbon costs and
avoiding the risk of relocation of production activities in places with laxer climate policy. The
risk of this phenomenon, referred to as carbon leakage, may be higher in certain energyintensive industries, such as steel and aluminum. Under the EU ETS, to limit the displacement
of emissions compensation is offered taking the form of free tradable permits to pollute
(allowances) assigned to specific industries.
Since the launch of the ETS in 2005, EU industries have followed divergent greenhouse gas
trajectories: while the power sector has cut them by half, cement and steelmakers, which got
free allowances for four-fifths of their exhausts, have barely decreased their emissions. To
stop this, under the European Green Deal the European Commission in July 2021 has
proposed replacing free allowances by a new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
under which importers would have to buy carbon certificates corresponding to the price paid
by European manufacturers. Foreign producers would be exempted from the levy only if they
can show that they paid a similar carbon price at home. And importers would then pay the
difference. Under the Commission’s proposal, CBAM will be phased in as of 2026 for a period
2
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of ten years, by which time EU industries covered by the scheme will stop receiving free CO2
permits on the EU carbon market. The policy of free allowances will continue in Phase 4
(2021-2030) of the EU ETS but based on more stringent criteria and improved data.
One question that remains relatively unaddressed is the extent of the risk of relocation against
which free allowances are issued. To determine the appropriate magnitude of these
compensations, it is essential to estimate how the firms’ propensity to locate their
investments changes because of carbon pricing and the emissions associated with these
investments. The empirical evidence on this issue is scant. Indeed, only a handful of papers
shed some light on carbon leakage within the EU ETS framework (Martin et al., 2014a; Martin
et al, 2014b; Borghesi et al., 2020; Koch and Basse Mama, 2019; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022).
This paper estimates the effect of the EU ETS on carbon leakage focusing on cross-country
investments. Using detailed firm-level data, a model of the firms’ production and investment
decisions is presented that allows to estimate how the probability of locating the productive
capacity in a country responds to the price of carbon in that country. The analytical
framework provides an estimable link between the data and carbon leakage. Firms that
employ a more energy intensive technology, or that cannot easily switch to less polluting fuels,
emit more and thus need to buy more pollution rights. Therefore, such firms are more likely
to locate their investments outside of the EU ETS, everything else equal. By choosing a location
outside of Europe, the firm trades off a lower price of carbon for higher installation and
operating costs. To capture this mechanism, we model the firm’s production choices linking
emission intensity to energy and carbon prices and to its technology. In so doing we can
identify each firm’s output elasticity to energy use, which drives the sensitivity of the firm to
the policy and affects the probability of investing within the EU ETS. This approach innovates
over the use of realized emission intensity to construct a measure of policy severity. Realized
emission intensities depend on energy and carbon prices and are thus endogenous to the
policy.
The second main contribution is the development of a novel dataset that combines emissions
and investment data for a panel of European individual firms. While between-industry
heterogeneity has been emphasized in the literature (Keller and Levinson, 2002;
Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004; Millimet and Roy, 2016; Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017),
little attention has been devoted to heterogeneity between firms, mostly for lack of firm-level
3
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data (Fowlie and Reguant, 2018). Absent this type of data, most of the empirical analysis has
turned to comparisons between industries. However, firms are substantially different in
energy use and emissions, even when they produce very similar goods (Lyubich et al., 2018).
More polluting firms are more affected by an environmental policy and may thus react more
strongly. Ignoring this source of heterogeneity is problematic for three reasons. First, the use
of industry aggregates instead of firm-level measures introduces an aggregation error. This
error causes an attenuation bias, resulting in an erroneous estimation of the firms’ response
to the environmental regulation. Second, the most polluting firms have the highest incentive
to locate their production abroad and could be the first to do so (Copeland, 2008). If all firms
within an industry are instead assumed to pollute the same amount, this selection problem
leads to underestimate the displaced emissions. Third, the decision to offer compensation for
carbon leakage is often taken on an industry-by-industry criterion rather than on an
individual firm basis. This fact disregards that, within an industry, firms have different
propensities to relocate and are more or less polluting, i.e. they contribute differently to the
risk of carbon leakage and should ideally be compensated accordingly.
The EU ETS provides an especially well-suited environment to study carbon leakage using
firm-level data because the information on emissions produced is available for each emitting
source. We focus the analysis on manufacturing and energy producing firms covered by the
EU ETS and their cross-country investments in new productive capacity, i.e. green-field
investments, over the period 2005 to 2012. The analysis of greenfield investments is
particularly appropriate for capturing the extensive margin effect of the EU ETS on carbon
leakage. These investments are motivated solely by the installation of new productive
capacity, thus we can rule out other reasons for investment, such as purely financial
investments or brand and technology acquisition. Moreover, since the compensations for
carbon leakage have the stated objective of keeping productive capacity within the EU ETS,
greenfield investments are the natural candidate for this analysis.
The empirical estimation is comprised of two stages. We recover the firm’s expected
compliance costs in each location in the first stage. These costs are not directly observable but
can be inferred from the data, invoking the conditions derived in the theoretical model. Here
we find strong support for within-industry heterogeneity, with output elasticities to energy
being as much as 37 times larger in the 75th percentile (0.32) than in the 25th percentile

4
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(0.008). Emission intensities are elastic to the allowance prices (-1.5) but fairly inelastic to
the price of energy (-0.1). Nevertheless, the same volume of investment can be expected to
generate as much as 15 times more emissions in a country with no carbon pricing and low
coal and oil prices. The second stage relates the choice of investing to the expected costs of
emitting in a country. A discrete choice model is estimated where the firm chooses whether
and where to invest among a rich set of countries based on the difference in expected profits.
We find that investments respond negatively to carbon pricing, but this effect is small in
magnitude. These small and precisely estimated effects are robust to different specifications.
Importantly, this effect is shown to disappear when firm heterogeneity is not taken into
account, thus underlining the importance of firm-level analysis. The model predictions are
analyzed under two policy-relevant scenarios. First, we predict how the probabilities of
investing in each country change with an increase in the allowance price to 30 euros over the
period 2005-2012. Second, we consider the case in which no free allowance is allocated to
firms.
Overall, this study finds that carbon pricing has discouraged investments in Europe in the
context of the EU ETS. However, it also finds that the aggregate magnitude of diverted
investments is economically small, suggesting that this motive alone does not justify the
generous compensation scheme that has been in place until today.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional details of the EU
ETS and how the compensation scheme works; Section 3 presents the theoretical model;
Section 4 presents the data; Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy and presents the main
results; Section 6 presents the implications for policy, while Section 7 discuss the robustness
checks before concluding.

2. Background
2.1 Related literature
This paper contributes to a large literature on pollution havens and carbon leakage. The
pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) posits that the compliance costs associated with an
environmental policy impair the competitiveness of polluting firms, which thus flee towards
countries with a laxer regulation (Copeland and Taylor, 2005). Within the PHH literature, the
papers that most relate to the present study are those using investment and plant location
5
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data.1 This literature argues that the introduction of an environmental policy affects
negatively the productivity of capital. Therefore, capital reallocates to equalize its global rate
of return causing an outflow of foreign direct investments.2
This paper contributes to the PHH literature by introducing firm-level heterogeneity. Most
other studies rely on aggregated measures of abatement costs, such as survey indicators
(Wagner and Timmins, 2009), industry expenditures for environmental protection (List and
Co, 2000; Keller and Levinson, 2002; Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004), average industry
energy or emission intensity (Xing and Kolstad, 2002; List et al., 2003, 2004) and industry
indicators for energy prices (Aldy and Pizer, 2015; Fowlie et al., 2016; Fowlie and Reguant,
2018; Saussay and Sato, 2018).3 These measures are usually considered at industry level, even
when firm-level investments were available. In contrast, we use here firm-level data for both
abatement costs and investments. The empirical strategy followed here, based on recovering
the output elasticity to energy and building counterfactual compliance costs, can be applied
in more general contexts to investigate the effect of carbon pricing on firms’ outcomes.
This paper also contributes to the large literature on the effects of carbon pricing on
environmental and economic outcomes, where the EU ETS represents a major policy example
(Verde, 2020). Most empirical papers dealing with the evaluation of the EU ETS on firms’
outcomes (European Commission, 2015; Martin et al., 2016) suggest a cohesive theme: firms
responded to carbon pricing by reducing emissions (Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Wagner et al.,
2014, Colmer et al., 2020), switching fuels (Ellerman and McGuinness, 2008) and innovating
(Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016). But they did not reduce employment (Commins et al., 2011)
and profits (Martin et al., 2016) or lose productivity (Jaraité and Di Maria, 2012; D’Arcangelo
Alternatively, and more frequently, pollution haven studies have considered trade flows: see Jaffe et al. (1995),
Copeland and Taylor (2004), and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) for reviews on the use of trade data in
investigating the pollution haven hypothesis. More recently, Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) address specifically
the carbon leakage problem, performing an ex-post analysis of the Kyoto protocol.

1

2

See Jeppesen et al. (2002) for a review of early contributions.

These last papers investigate how an increase in energy cost can be used to infer the increase in costs due to
carbon pricing, and thus carbon leakage. They are therefore closely related to the present paper. Fowlie et al.
(2016) and Fowlie and Reguant (2018) estimate the elasticity of production, imports and exports to energy
prices, capturing between-industry heterogeneity, and use the estimates to simulate the effect of $10/tCO2
carbon price on these variables. Saussay and Sato (2018) use rich data on mergers and acquisition of
multinational firms to study how they are affected by differences in a country energy price index. This paper
directly uses emissions data and builds on their intuition that energy prices are an important element in
assessing firms’ response to carbon pricing. As shown below, we do so by explicitly allowing emissions to depend
on energy prices.
3
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et al., 2022). Indeed, certain industries, like power generators, benefited from the EU ETS
cashing on the free allowances (Veith et al., 2009; Bushnell et al., 2013) and passing-through
the price of carbon to consumers (Verde et al., 2019; Cludius et al., 2020). In line with these
results, the findings on international investments in this paper add evidence and support to
the argument that the EU ETS has not jeopardized Europe’s competitiveness.
Finally, this paper contributes to the empirical evidence on the effect of the EU ETS on
investment leakage.4 Martin et al. (2014a; 2014b) use interviews to the managers of more
than 700 firms of six countries to assess the risk of carbon leakage for manufacturing firms.
The authors find that economic activity is not likely to contract because of carbon pricing,
although more emission intensive firms could display a stronger response. Borghesi et al.
(2020) investigate whether the EU ETS had any effect on outward FDIs of regulated
manufacturing firms in Italy. They use a difference-in-difference approach applied to sample
extracted from the Aida database of Italian companies from 2002 to 2010. The sub-samples
for years 2002-2004, 2005-2007, and 2008-2010 used for estimations include treatment
groups of 283 regulated firms. The authors find a positive weak effect on the number of new
subsidiaries abroad and a larger effect on the production occurring in foreign subsidiaries,
especially in trade-intensive sectors. Considering outward FDI of German multinationals,
Koch and Basse Mama (2016) obtain similar results , again using a difference-in-differences
with bias-corrected matching estimator. The authors find that only a small subset of firms
significantly increased their FDI out of Europe, compared with a counterfactual scenario.
However, such firms do not belong to the sectors at risk of relocation according to the EU
criteria, but rather to sectors that are less capital intensive, and therefore more geographically
mobile. Using a sample from database of the Carbon Disclosure Project covering 1122
companies (261 regulated) over the period 2007–2014, Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) study
whether emissions from subsidiaries belonging to the same multinational firm react
differently if the subsidiary is located outside or inside the EU ETS. They find no evidence of
any carbon leakage effect in general, and the same applies with respect to those sectors
deemed at risk of carbon leakage.

4 Earlier works

used computable general equilibrium models to provide ex-ante assessments of regional policies
on carbon leakage. While these models can capture every channel of carbon leakage, they often rely on very
restrictive assumptions on markets, technology and trade. Carbone and Rivers (2017) review this work.

7
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Rather than through survey evidence as in Martin et al. (2014a; 2014b), in this paper we
provide direct estimates on the magnitude of these effects using observational data. While in
papers such as Koch and Basse Mama (2016) and Borghesi et al. (2020) identification relies
on a difference-in-differences approach, augmented with methods to correct selection, the
definition of a control group proves typically difficult (see also Verde, 2020). In contrast, we
propose here a different methodology which leverages idiosyncratic differences between
treated firms to identify the causal effect of the EU ETS on firms and that can be easily applied
to other contexts in which emission data are available. Finally, the results of the above papers
including Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) complement those contained here as they can’t be used
to evaluate changes in the policy, e.g. in the compensation scheme, because they do not
provide a model of the firm’s behavior, as done in this paper.

2.2 EU ETS and free allowances allocation and compensation rules
The rules governing the allocation of emission allowances are a fundamental component of
the EU ETS setup. In a cap-and-trade system such as the EU ETS, allowances can be distributed
to installations for free, through auctions, or using a mix of the two methods. The mixed
method represents the most common case for systems that are not limited to the power
sector, where auctioning is the standard option, while for other sectors a portion of free
allowances is always distributed to regulated firms.
In the EU ETS free allocation rules have significantly changed over trading periods as part of
wider reforms, including the latest changes for Phase IV.5 During both Phase I (2005-2007)
and Phase II (2008-2012) “grandfathering” was the basic allocation regime. Determining the
total volume of allowances and their allocation was the responsibility of national
governments through the so-called National Allocation Plans (NAPs). They could auction up
to 5% and 10% of the total number of allowances in Phase I and Phase II, respectively, based
on emissions at plant level. In practice during Phase 1 the entirety of the EUAs available in the
EU ETS was allocated to firms for free, while the proportion of free allowances declined in
Phase 2 to around 94%.

5 See

Ellerman et al. (2016) and https://fsr.eui.eu/eu-emission-trading-system-eu-ets/ for details on the reform
process.

8
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In Phase 3 (2013-2020) the major institutional innovation was the centralization of the
system: the total volume of allowances was now determined in Brussels. The allocation
regime was radically changed: auctioning became the default allocation method for electricity
generating installations, while for all other installations benchmarked allocation was
introduced. The application of emission efficiency benchmarks is combined with the
identification of the sectors at risk of carbon leakage. Installations in the sectors deemed at
significant risk of carbon leakage are given free allowances covering 100% of their
benchmarked emissions, whereas for the other sectors free allowances cover progressively
smaller shares of benchmarked emissions, from 80% in 2013 to as little as 30% in 2020.
The reform for Phase IV (2013-2020) includes better-targeting free allocation. The new rule
is more stringent than the one applied in Phase III, so that the number of sectors classified as
being at risk will shrink.
The case of free allocation represents an aspect of special interest for the implications in terms
of both equity and competitiveness (Flues and van Dender, 2017; Verde et al., 2020). Absent
frictions, the initial allowances allocation should not affect the efficiency of the policy, in
application of Coase theorem. Notwithstanding, recipients do benefit from free allowances,
regardless of whether they use them to offset their own emissions or to resell them. Therefore,
the free allocation of allowances is potentially problematic, as the associated rent violates the
“polluter pays-principle”, as stated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(Article 191(2)).
As to competitiveness concerns and the risk of carbon leakage, the allocation of free
allowances was in practice based on historical emissions until 2011 (“grandfathering”). Since
2012, the allocation is based on product benchmarks, defined for 52 product classes (e.g. iron
casting, uncoated carton board, white cement clinker). It is defined as the average emission
intensity of the 10 percent best performing regulated installations producing that product in
terms of CO2 per ton of product.6 Since Phase 3, new investments are entitled to free
allowances, calculated on the capacity installed and applying the same product benchmarks.

The only factor in the allocation that varies by firm is the “historical activity level”. This activity level is based
on the years 2005-2008 (and/or 2009-2010 if available) and calculated on the production volumes. The installed
output or thermal capacity are instead used if historical volumes are missing.

6
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It is therefore important to take into account this aspect when calculating the total effect of
the EU ETS on investments.
An important exemption from auctioning is provided to sectors deemed at a significant risk
of carbon leakage. Firms in these manufacturing sectors (but not electricity producers)
continue to receive allowances for free: after applying the industry benchmark, free
allowances in exempted industries are expected to entirely cover demand in these industries.
These sectors are defined at a 4-digit or 6-digit product classification code on the basis of two
sector-wide criteria: trade intensity and carbon intensity. Trade intensity is calculated as the
ratio between the total value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports from third
countries and the total market size for the Union. Carbon intensity is proxied by summing
sectoral estimates of direct and indirect costs of carbon pricing divided by the gross value
added of the sector.7 The industries at risk of carbon leakage are categorized in one of three
ways: A) carbon intensity above 0.3; B) trade intensity above 0.3; or C) carbon intensity above
0.05 and trade intensity above 0.1.8 The exemption coverage is quite considerable, as it
applies to approximately half of the firms in the EU ETS (Martin et al., 2014a). Firms exempted
from auctioning received between 600 and 800 million free allowances per year. While
auctioning was progressively introduced in other industries, it did not apply to exempted
industries. In 2017, the difference generated as much as 1.1 bn€ in additional profits for the
exempted firms, i.e. around €390 000 on average per firm.9
Because of data limitations, the empirical application in this paper focuses on the first two
phases, in which auctioning was in practice not used. The advantage is that all firms were
under the same regime, eliminating a possible confounding channel in explaining firms’
behavior, which we now model.

7 Direct costs are calculated on a price proxy of e30 per ton of CO2 produced, even though the price of allowances

has historically been much lower. Indirect costs proxy the higher costs of electricity, calculated on the basis of
national consumption data and considering the same proxy price.
8 In Phase IV, as a rule, a sector will be classified as being at risk of carbon leakage if the product of the carbon
emissions intensity indicator (CeI) (expressed in terms of KgCO2 per Euro of gross value added) and the TI
indicator, UVW × YW, exceeds 0.2. This rule is more stringent than the one applied in Phase III.
9

Details on these calculations are given in Appendix A.

10
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3. The model
To motivate the empirical analysis that follows we introduce a model designed to capture the
effect of carbon pricing on the firm’s investment location decisions. The main elements that
determine whether a polluting investment will be located under the EU ETS are the allowance
price, the free allowances received, and how energy intensive is the technology employed by
the firm. This last factor is key: even in the same industry, firms employ energy to very
different extents and energy use is related to emissions. Because firms are heterogeneous in
emission intensity, firms with higher emissions are more sensitive to the policy. The model
provides a framework that allows to recover compliance costs from observed emissions and
to calculate these costs for new investments.
The model description proceeds in two steps. Firstly, we look at the firm’s choice of energy
sources. The data does not contain firm-level energy use nor demand for energy sources, but
energy prices are observed for several locations. It is therefore useful to rewrite the problem
in terms of emissions, rather than in terms of energy choices. We therefore derive the firm’s
choice for emissions, which crucially depend on the output elasticity to energy. This condition
is used to infer the firm’s expected compliance costs with the policy in each location, which
are not observed. Secondly, we model how the decision of investing internationally is
influenced by these costs.

3.1 The firm’s emissions choice
A price-taking firm uses energy and other inputs to produce an output Y according to a
production function that is assumed to be homogeneous in energy use. That is:
(1)
where
of

=

=

∑

are the quantities of S energy sources (different fuels, electricity) and X is the vector
non-energy input quantities including labor, fixed capital, intermediate materials.

Individual energy sources can be aggregated into a total energy input E via a CES aggregator
function with substitution parameter

and share parameters

reflecting the intensity of

each source in the production of energy.10 We make this assumption for illustrative purposes
Constant returns to scale for the energy technology are assumed without loss of generality. The substitution
elasticity between individual energy sources is given by 1/ 1 − .
10

11
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and relax it later in the empirical model. In addition, ! is the output elasticity to energy use,
representing the relevance of energy in production.

Using energy generates harmful emissions according to their carbon content, " . Since no end-

of-pipe abatement technology, such as CO2 filters or carbon sequestration, is practically in use,

the carbon content of each energy source is exogenous to the firm. Total carbon emissions CE
are given by the sum of emissions produced from the different energy sources, according to
their carbon content:

# =∑

(2)

"

.
are purchased at unitary prices $% ,

Using inputs in production is costly and energy sources
while other inputs are purchased at prices $ & = $

.11 The firm chooses the levels of

inputs to maximize its profits '. The firm offsets the emissions produced by purchasing
allowances at price ( but receives an endowment of free allowances #

maximizing problem is the following:
(3)

max

% ,…,%/ ,& ,…,&0

' = $1 − ∑

−∑

$&

$%

∗

. The (static) profit

−( # −#

∗

subject to (1)-(2). We do not solve for the optimal input choices problem (3) because in the
empirical analysis we crucially use firm-level data that does not contain information on
energy use. We can get around this problem by expressing profits in terms of emissions rather
than energy sources. Letting the price $2 =
maximization problem:12

(4)

max

& ,…,&0 ,:;

$1 Ω ∙ #

345 6784
94

−∑

we solve the following unconstrained profit
$&

− > $% , (; ,

# + (#

∗

where:

(5)
and > $% , (; ,

Ω = A∑

$2

B

C

D

A∑

" $2

B

C

is the per-emission cost sustained by the firm to produce one additional unit

We think of energy as being expressed in kilowatt-hours or megajoules. This notion of energy as a
homogeneous good approximates well most uses in manufacturing and energy producers. For example, heat,
electricity and kinetic energy are all measured in energy units.

11

12

Appendix B.1 reports the details of the derivations.

12
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of energy:
(6)

> $ , (; ,
%

= EA∑

$2

B

C A∑

" $2

B

D

C F.

The unit cost of energy depends on the price vector of energy sources $% , the carbon price (,
and the vector

collecting the parameters

affects the firms’ profitability through #

and shift profits upward by (#

∗

∗

and . Expression (3) shows how the EU ETS

and (. Free allowances act as a lump-sum transfer

as the firm can always sell them at market price. This free

allocation of allowances does not affect the production choices because the amount is fixed
for the firm. On the other hand, a higher price of carbon gives the firm an incentive to reduce
CE by adjusting production, switching to less emitting fuels and readjusting other inputs.

Compared to the laissez-faire case, in which the price of carbon is zero, the average cost of
production increases and the difference is the compliance cost for the firm. The magnitude of
this compliance cost depends on the energy mix and on the importance of energy in the
production of the output.
The first order condition of problem (4) with respect to emissions states that the revenue

share of an input expenditure is constant and equal to its output elasticity !. The condition

can be written in terms of emissions per unit of revenue, i.e. in terms of emission intensity, :
(7)

= 3G H = ! ∙ > $% , (; ,
:;

D

The equilibrium emission intensity depends on two elements: (i) the output elasticity to
energy ! and (ii) the price of emissions > . . The output elasticity to energy captures the
importance of energy in the productive process. For example, it reflects the melting or

reaction temperatures of intermediate inputs, the kinetic energy needed for transformation
of state or the electricity needed for machinery to work. Productive processes where energy

is a key factor, such as iron or paper production, can be expected to have a higher !, everything
else equal. While ! evidently varies across industries, it is also likely to differ across firms

within the same industry as different productive processes are often available to produce the
same product. The term > $% , (; ,

is the firm’s total price of emissions and depends on how

the firm can organize its energy mix. An increase in the price of carbon ( induces a

reorganization of the energy mix towards less polluting energy sources. Since the cost of
energy increases as a result, the emission intensity decreases. On the other hand, an increase
13
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in the price of one individual energy source $% has an ambiguous effect on emission, as

discussed in Appendix B.2.

Expression (7) can be used to obtain estimates of ! and of > $% , (; ,

.13 Expressing

emissions in terms of revenue shares rather than estimating the production function to obtain

! is crucial for the empirical application as it solves two challenges in the identification of that

parameter. First, it breaks the problem of simultaneity between total factor productivity

(TFP) and emissions. In (11), the TFP term A appears in the dependent variable (inside Y) and

does not need to be controlled for. 14 Similarly, output prices $ 1 are unobserved and, if they

vary across firms, are potentially endogenous to inputs. Since they appear in the left hand side
of (11), unobserved output prices are allowed to correlate with emissions.

3.2 The firm’s investment location decision
We now model the international investment decision, introducing most of the notation used
in the empirical analysis. A foreign investment consists of an installation of given productive
capacity controlled by a parent firm, indexed by i. Each year t a parent firm can make a new
∗
= 1 denote the decision to make a new
foreign investment in each country j = 1, …., J. Let 'JKL

∗
= 0 otherwise. Following McGrattan and Prescott (2009),
investment in country j and 'JKL

Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) and Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), we assume

that the technology of the investing firm is transferred to the foreign investment. The parent
firm observes prices in each available location and forms an expectation on the profits the

investment will generate in the future. Let 'JKL denote the expected net present value of these

profits and

JKL

the fixed costs of investing. The parent firm invests in every location that

delivers a positive profit 'JKL net of fixed costs. That is:
(8)

∗
=N
'JKL

1 if 'JKL >

JKL

0 otherwise

First order conditions such as this one have been used extensively in the production function literature to
estimate heterogeneous input elasticities (Hall, 1988; Grieco and McDevitt, 2016; Doraszelski and Jaumandreu,
2018).
13

Methods exist to address the simultaneity problem (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003;
Ackerberg et al., 2015), using a control function to separate A from the error term. In those models, however, no
variation separately identifies A and α when both are firm-specific.

14
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Notice that a firm can make as many investments as there are countries. The outside option
for the firm is to not invest abroad at all, in which case we assume that the associated expected
profits are zero.
The investment decision depends on the environmental policy in the following way. If the firm
locates within the geographical scope of the EU ETS it faces carbon pricing and pays the
associated compliance costs. At the same time, it expects to obtain free allowances in
proportion to the capital invested. Let

∗
JKL

∗
;YZ

= 3G

H
[YZ [YZ

denote the free allowances per unit of

revenue that the firm receives in this case. The price of allowances (KL is common to all firms

and takes value (L in countries covered by the EU ETS and 0 otherwise. Let \]JKL = (KL
∗
JKL

JKL

−

denote the market value of the net emissions generated by the investment per unit of

revenue. The profit function can be generally parametrized as follows:
'JKL = ^_JKL ` + aJL \]JKL = ^_JKL ` + aJL b(KL

(9)

JKL

−

∗
JKL

c

where ^JKL is a vector of profit shifters. If the investment is located in a regulated country the
profits the parent company expects to receive from the new foreign investment are affected
by the EU ETS, with parameter aJL representing the magnitude of this effect. A firm with a

higher output elasticity to energy ! can expect to have higher compliance costs under the EU

ETS, everything else equal.
The measures

JKL

and

∗
JKL

represent expectations of the firm and are therefore not directly

observable. They are, however, correlated with the emission intensity and free allowances
experienced by the parent firm, which are observed. Let
respectively. Both

JKL

JdL

and

JdL

and

∗
JdL

denote these measures,

are determined at the firm level by its technological

endowment, i.e. by its output elasticity to energy ! which can be used to relate the two
measures. On the other hand,

We can then use data on

JdL

∗
JKL

and

relates to
∗
JdL ,

∗
JdL

through the EU ETS allowance allocation rules.

which are observed, to infer

JKL

and

JdL .

4. Data
The analysis combines firm level data from several sources. The final dataset contains
information on investment decisions, balance sheet data on inputs and outputs and data on
emissions and free allowances received. The covered firms are those subject to the EU ETS

15
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over the years 2005-2012. We complement firm-level data with country-level energy data,
combining data from several sources. We describe the different sets of data hereafter.
Investment data. We obtain investment data from fDi Markets, an online database operated
by fDi Intelligence, a division of the Financial Times Ltd.15 The database collects information
on cross-country investments of multinational companies, focusing on greenfield
investments. A greenfield investment is defined as the construction of a brand-new plant or
the expansion of an existing one. It therefore consists of an expansion of productive capacity.
The data collected are based on investment announcements in media sources and company
data; the information is updated daily and 90% of it is cross-referenced with company
sources. The database contains precise information on the geographical origin and
destination of the investment, as well as the amount of the capital investment.
Data on firms’ inputs and output. Financial accounting data are obtained from Orbis, an online
database maintained by Bureau van Dijk.16 Orbis covers a vast number of companies
worldwide and includes balance sheet data as well as profit and loss account data, that
register revenues as well as expenditures for inputs.
EU ETS data. Data on emissions are contained in the publicly available database EU
Transaction Log (EUTL, formerly known as CITL).17 For each “account holder” (a firm), the
EUTL contains the address of the holder, the verified emissions of each installation, the free
allowances allocated, and the status of the account. For each year we know if the account was
active and whether it was compliant. Out of the 9,263 (non-aircraft operator) account holders
under the EU ETS, we find a matching name with Orbis for 8,047 accounts.
Energy data. The main source for energy price data is the International Energy Agency (IEA)
Energy Prices and Taxes dataset.18 It contains detailed data on the prices of several energy
sources, covering all OECD countries and some selected non-OECD countries. We consider
here the prices of oil (light fuel oil), gas (natural gas), electricity and coal (steam coal). All

15

https://www.fdiintelligence.com/fdi-markets

16

https://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/data/international/orbis

17

https://ec.europa.eu/clima/ets/

18

https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/oecd-energy-prices-and-taxes-quarterly
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prices are expressed at constant U.S. dollars per unit of fuel and are harmonized across
countries to account for different quality.19
Based on the above data sources we match the fDi Markets and the EUTL data using the name
matching feature commercially provided by Bureau van Dijk on the Orbis platform. The
results are verified on the basis of geographic and activity coherence (the only information
available in all three datasets besides the name). We find a matching name in Orbis for 80%
of the firms in the fDi Markets dataset and 87% of those in the EUTL. The total number of
investments from firms covered by the EU ETS is 1,537 with a combined value of 139 billion
euros. Investments are located in more than 50 countries, though some of the locations with
fewer investments are aggregated. Table 1 provides details on number and value of
investments by country, whereas Table 2 provides the same information by sector. The
median investment is sizable (24 million Euro), but the dataset also contains smaller
investments (around 150 000 Euro). The industries with more investments are automotive
and chemicals. They are also the most important in terms of monetary size of investments,
followed by the Coal, Oil and Natural Gas sector.
Table 1: Number and size of investments by location
Number

Value (bn€)

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria*
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Romania*
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
UK

26
55
19
13
74
39
39
11
11
58
62
25
53
19
41

0.8
3.6
1.5
0.7
3.3
5.1
3.9
0.5
2.8
5.8
5.5
5.9
4.4
0.9
2.4

Total ETS countries
Brazil
Canada

545
40
24

47.2
5.4
2.5

% of FDI1
21.1
15.6
8.0
8.6
11.9
1.3
5.5
18.7

5.3
1.9
1.8

2.2

When available, we use information on after-tax prices for industrial consumers. This dataset is characterized
by significant missing values (35% of annual prices are not available), especially for coal. We impute missing
values using a reduced-form predictive model, detailed in Appendix D.

19
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China
India
Indonesia
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Other Central Asia
Other East Asia and Pacific
Other Europe
Other Latin America and Caribbeans
Other Middle East
Other North Africa
Other Sub-Saharan Africa
Russia
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
UAE
Ukraine
United States
Vietnam
Total Non ETS countries

Total

208
112
9
12
14
36
6
8
45
40
23
10
14
75
25
12
18
12
15
17
20
17
167
13
992

27.3
6.9
0.5
0.5
0.8
4.9
0.6
0.2
3.2
5.1
6.9
2.0
0.4
4.0
3.5
1.0
2.0
0.6
0.1
1.4
0.8
0.6
10.7
0.3
92.2

1537

139.4

3.7
6.3

1.9
6.7

1.6

Notes: Investments by firms covered by EU ETS in the years 2005-2012. Bulgaria and
Romania became EU members in 2007. Only the investments used for the empirical
analysis included. 1 The last column compares the monetary value of the investments
in the dataset with the total inward FDI value (source: OECD) in the manufacturing
sector for OECD countries.

Table 2: Number and size of investments by industry

Aerospace & Defence
Alternative/Renewable energy
Automotive
Beverages
Biotechnology
Building & Construction Materials
Ceramics & Glass
Chemicals
Coal, Oil and Natural Gas
Consumer Products
Food & Tobacco
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools

Number

Value (bn€)

37
44
427
20
12
89
47
331
67
33
34
8

1.7
8.7
46.2
0.6
0.3
7.3
1.8
28.3
18.0
0.7
0.6
1.0

18
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Med devices & Healthcare
Metals & Minerals
Paper, Printing & Packaging
Pharmaceuticals
Plastics
Rubber
Textiles
Transport (other)
Wood Products
Other

30
56
46
79
37
84
13
22
11
10

Total

1537

0.5
3.8
6.3
3.0
1.1
7.4
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2

139.4

Notes: Investments by firms covered by EU ETS in the years 2005-2012. Only the
investments used for the empirical analysis included. The category ”Other” includes
industries with less than 5 investments in the dataset.

Table 3 shows descriptive statistics on the firms included in the dataset. Firms differ in their
emission intensity and the distribution is very skewed to the right: on average they emit 10
tons of CO2 per thousand euro of revenues, but the median is much lower at 1.4 tons. Similarly,
the expenditure on allowances, net of free allocation, is on average equal to 3% of total
revenues, but the median expenditure is closer to 0.3%. In 24% of the cases a firm has
received more free allowances than it has surrendered, thus benefiting from the EU ETS.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Mean
976

s.d.
7652

p25
16.5

p50
53.7

p75
216

Free allowances (k)

379

2296

10.7

29.8

107

Regulated installations (n)
Emissions/Sales (tons/(k€)

2.20
10.3

3.51
42.5

1.00
0.31

1.00
1.42

2.00
6.59

Gross Value of Emissions/Sales

124

577

2.87

14.8

76

Net Value of Emissions/Sales (k€)

32.7

679

0.006

2.87

21.7

Revenues (M€)

701

5060

12.0

53.8

217

Cost of employees (M€)

85.5

707

1.41

6.28

26.2

Fixed Assets (M€)

574

5126

7.49

32.3

128

N = 4,194 firms
Emissions (kt)

19
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5. Empirical analysis
In this section we estimate the determinants of the foreign investment decisions. Emission
intensity,

∗
JKL , and the free allowances received, JKL

determine the compliance costs. These two

measures are not observed for new investments but correlate with those associated to the
activity of the parent firm,

JdL

and

∗
JdL ,

which are observed. Appendix C shows how firms

investing in the EU ETS have higher emission intensities and lower free allowance received,
providing preliminary evidence in favor of the model.
Even in the same industry, firms use energy to quite different extents. Thus, as a first step we
recover firm-specific estimates of the technological parameter that determines this difference
!. With this estimate at hand, we construct measures for

JKL

and

∗
JKL .

Subsequently, we

examine the extent to which this difference affects the investments decisions, estimating the
empirical counterpart of (7).
Before proceeding we observe that the model has the advantage of allowing for a large choice
set, comprised of all the J available countries, but this comes at the cost of two simplifying

assumptions. First, the firm does not take into account how investing today will affect its
future investments. Agglomeration effects can increase the profitability of sequential
investments in the same location (Wagner and Timmins, 2009). Second, the firm does not
form expectations on future prices and especially on the allowance price. As ignoring these
dynamics can theoretically bias estimates, we provide evidence of the contrary in the
robustness checks.

5.1 Estimation of emission intensities
In this section we estimate the determinants of emissions using domestic data (j = 0) following
the theoretical model of Section 3. Let the vector of country-wide energy prices for the
domestic

country

%
%
%
, $%g%,KL
, $hi
e$fJg,KL

and

%
,KL $8fig,KL j.

the

candidate

locations

be

denoted

by

%
=
$KL

The cost of carbon is denoted by (KL . Let k denote the industry in

which firm i operates. We estimate this empirical counterpart of (11) after taking logs:
(10)

log

JdL

%
= log !J + log >m $dL
, (dL + nJdL

where nJdL is an iid disturbance. Here, we crucially let !J to vary with the firm: in the empirical

model this is an unobserved source of heterogeneity that we model as a firm fixed effect. The
20
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%
term >m $dL
, (dL is allowed to depend on the industry to capture industry-specific differences

in

m.

Equation (10) makes clear that the data are domestic (j = 0), as said. After !J is taken

%
, (dL explains the remaining difference in emission intensities, capturing
into account, >m $dL

the effect of energy prices and carbon prices the firm faces in its country of origin. Because of
this term,

JdL

cannot be used directly as a measure of the firm’s sensitivity to carbon leakage.

Low emission intensities might be caused by high prices of energy (or low allowance prices),
but production from an investment could be more polluting if located where energy is
expensive (or allowances are cheap).

%
, (dL has a parametric form. Absent !J ,
On the basis of the model laid out in Section 3, >m $dL

(10) could in principle be estimated parametrically, using standard non-linear techniques.

However, if more generally !J ≠ !J p , estimation is more complicated. The non- linearity of
%
, (dL makes it impossible to proceed with the standard within estimator, which
>m $dL

recovers the fixed effect by subtraction. We therefore estimate (10) using a semi nonparametric approach similar to Baltagi and Li (2002). We consider a power series
%
, (dL choosing the precise specification through k-class cross validation.20
approximation of $dL

As a data-driven model selection technique, cross validation helps address the risk of

overfitting a polynomial, selecting the model that minimizes the loss due to the tradeoff
between bias and variance of the estimates. Estimation then proceeds by standard within
estimation. Proceeding this way also partially relaxes the assumption on the functional form
adopted for energy production, which is not constrained by any parametric form in the
empirical model.
Table 5 presents the estimates for the elasticity of the emission intensity to carbon and energy
prices as in equation (10). Column 1 reports the results for an OLS regression, including year
and industry intercept shifters. Column 2 is estimated including year and firm-specific fixed
%
, (dL ,
effects. Column 3 is the main specification, as it allows for industry-specific >m $dL

obtained interacting with industry dummies each price and their transformations. Column 4
also includes a country-specific slope coefficient for coal price, to control for the fact that the
20 The power series we use includes all prices (in logs), their square, and their interactions, as well as year
dummies. The details are discussed in Appendix D. Estimation then proceeds by standard within estimation.
Since series estimators work by linear approximation, this solves the problem of estimating the fixed effects
without resorting to stronger assumptions on the data generating process. Proceeding this way also partially
relaxes the assumption on the functional form adopted for energy production, which is not constrained by any
parametric form in the empirical model.
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coal market is more regional than gas or oil. The results reported in the table are the averages
taken across industries.

Table 5: Emission intensity elasticity to prices

ETS price
Oil price
Electricity price

Gas price
Coal price
No. observations
No. firms
Adjusted R2
Within R2
year
country & industry fixed effects
firm fixed effects
industry slope
coal country slope

(1)
OLS

(2)
FE
-1.432***

(3)
FE
-1.473∗∗∗

(4)
FE
-1.478∗∗∗

-1.295***
(0.145)
0.147
(0.213)
0.083
(0.109)
-0.071
(0.107)
0.140
(0.085)

(0.082)
-0.139
(0.122)
-0.092
(0.070)
0.094∗
(0.047)
0.147∗∗
(0.056)

(0.085)
-0.136
(0.117)
-0.039
(0.067)
0.043
(0.048)
0.069
(0.048)

(0.082)
-0.074
(0.116)
-0.059
(0.055)
0.048
(0.047)
-0.079
(0.052)

23661

23758

23661

23661

4083
0.34

4093

4083

4083

0.50
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

0.53
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

0.53
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Notes: All prices are logged. Estimates are obtained by regressing the log of per-revenue
%
, (dL .
emissions log JdL on a second-order series approximation of the carbon cost index >m $dL
Specification (1) is the OLS estimate, including year, country and industry fixed effects;
specification (2) includes years and firm fixed effects; specification (3) also includes industryspecific elasticities: those reported are mean elasticities across industries; specification (4) also
includes country-specific coefficient for coal: those reported are mean elasticities across
industries and countries. Elasticities are estimated with the delta method. Standard error
clustered at the firm-level in parenthesis. Three asterisks indicate a significance with p < 0.001.

The table shows that an increase in the price of carbon is associated with an elastic reduction
in emissions, suggesting that firms do react to the policy. Energy prices elasticity are less
precisely estimated, especially in the first two specifications. This could be due by the
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incapacity of firms to adjust quickly their energy mix or possibly to correlation between the
prices.21

5.2 Construction of expected compliance costs

We now compute the expected compliance costs per unit of revenue \]JKL = (KL

JKL

−

∗
JKL

,

which is the variable of interest for the location decision model. For investments within the
EU ETS, the median counterfactual compliance cost is 0.13 percentage points, the average is
1pct and its standard deviation is 0.43pct. For comparison, the observed expenditure share of
emissions in the original data have a median of 0.15pct, average 1.26pct, and standard
deviation 0.59pct, respectively. Since the price of allowances is zero outside of the EU ETS,
\]JKL = 0 in this case.

Note that expected compliance costs are a constructed variable as free allowances and gross
emissions are estimated as described hereafter.
Free Allowances. A new investment generates free allowances if it is located within the EU
ETS, as discussed in Section 2. The amount of free allowances is calculated on the capacity
installed. We estimate the amount of free allowances a firm would receive in this case with
the following equation based on domestic data:
∗
JdL

(11)

= qm rJdL + sJdL

where rJdL is the accounting value of fixed assets, reported by firm i in its balance sheet. This

regression captures the between-industry differences in the way capital is accounted for
allowance assignment. The coefficient qm can be interpreted as the fraction of capital that is

employed in emitting activities under the EU ETS.22 The results are presented in Table 6.

Table 6: Free allowances per million euro of capital
qm

Standard
error

21 When differences

in industries are taken into account by estimating industry-specific elasticities, not reported
here, many are significant and have the expected sign.
Instead of resorting to estimation, it would be in principle possible to calculate the allowances, given the sector
benchmarks and the appropriate formula discussed in Section 2. However, data on volumetric capacity are not
available. The coefficient qm can be interpreted as the product of the benchmark times an estimated conversion
factor from accounting capital to volumetric capacity.
22
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Aerospace & Defense
Alternative Energy
Automotive
Beverages
Building & Construction Materials
Business Services
Ceramics & Glass
Chemicals
Coal, Oil and Natural Gas
Consumer Products
Electronic Components
Food & Tobacco
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools
Med devices & Healthcare
Metals & Minerals
Other (Combustion of fuels)
Paper, Printing & Packaging
Pharmaceuticals
Plastics
Real Estate
Rubber
Semiconductors
Software & IT services
Textiles
Transport (other)
Wood Products
No. of firms

11.8
4.1
1305.0
608.6
10.9
3.5
4.2
2.8
414.4
147.0
34.6
40.5
378.2
45.4
110.9
30.2
189.6
40.6
42.2
0.8
8.1
6.1
121.1
51.4
273.8
167.0
14.4
11.8
48.7
50.5
107.8
13.7
110.3
31.6
3.7
1.7
20.6
17.1
324.0
348.1
177.9
26.5
250.0
149.7
203.4
125.3
175.7
9.7
0.8
0.6
111.4
80.8
4189

Notes: The table reports estimates of free allowances assigned to firms as a
function of capital installed. The first column reports the industry-specific
coefficients and the second one its standard error, estimated by clustering
them. Five industries with less than 10 firms have not been reported.

The results show wide variation across industries, where heavy polluting industries receive
more free allowances per unit of physical capital and less polluting industries receive less. For
example, the sector “Alternative energy producers” (mostly biomass electricity generators)
receives 1,305 free allowances per million of fixed asset. Most of the physical capital in this
industry is connected to power generation, which is eligible for free allowances. On the other
hand, “Transport (other)”, which includes mostly shipping and logistic companies, receives
very few allowances per fixed assets million (0.8 per M€, or €10.4 if the price is €13).
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∗
We use this information to obtain an estimate of free allowances for new investments tJdL
=

qtm rJdL if the firm locates within the EU ETS. If the firm locates the investment outside the EU

ETS, it receives zero free allowances.

Gross Emissions. The firm forms an expectation on how much its new investment is going to
emit. These expectations are not observed, but they can be recovered using once again the
condition derived in Section 3.1. As discussed, the emission intensity depends on the output
%
, (KL . We
elasticity to energy !J and on the prices of carbon and energy through >m $KL

construct an estimate for the expected emission intensity using:
log

(12)

JKL

= log !uJ + log >tmKL

%
, (KL we form in-sample
where !uJ is the estimate of !J from (10). To obtain >tmKL = >tm $KL

predictions using the energy prices of each possible destination. For this method to predict
the right emissions per revenue, the technology of the firm needs not to depend on the country
!JK ≠ !J . Importantly, this conditional emission intensity allows for fuel switches (an effect

captured in >tmKL ) or input substitution. Moreover, in Section 3.1 it was shown that, under a

Cobb-Douglas production, per-revenue emissions are not affected by other factors, such as

labor and capital prices and total factor productivity. This condition states that the process in
which energy is transformed into output is the same in the headquarter and in the new plant.
Focusing the analysis on greenfield investments, i.e. investments in new productive capacity,
excludes mergers and acquisitions and vertical investments in non-productive subsidiaries
and reinforces this assumption. In addition, given the context of mature and heavy
manufacturing firms and energy producers, this assumption seems credible. We visualize the
distribution of observed emission intensities
JKL

in Figure 1.

JdL

and estimated expected emission intensities

Figure 1: Expected and observed emission intensity
.4

.3
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Notes: Kernel density of the expected emission intensities. The solid line represents the density of the
expected emission intensities, predicted using equation (10). The dashed line represents the emission
intensities observed domestically for the investing firm. The emission intensities on the x-axis are
expressed in log10 tons of CO2 per thousand euros of revenues. The graph is cropped for readability
(0.13% observations dropped).

5.3 Estimation of the location decision model
We consider the following empirical counterpart of equation (13):
(13)

'JKL = ^K_ ` + a \]K + vK + wJKL

where wJKL is an i.i.d. unobserved profit component. The vector ^K contains control variables

typically used in the trade literature on gravity equations (Anderson, 2011). Specifically, it
includes two measures of distance: geographical distance and a measure of cultural distance.
For geographical distance, we calculate the distance in kilometers from the centroid of the
country of origin to the centroid of the country of destination. For cultural distance, a dummy
is used equal to one if the two countries share a common official language. Secondly, it
includes economic variables that control for economic activity such as GDP, GDP per capita
and total exports. All these variables are in logs. Finally, it includes the (log of) inward foreign
direct investment of the previous year. This variable serves the purpose of controlling for
aggregation effects in addition to proxying general attractiveness (Wagner and Timmins,
2009). The variable is lagged by one year to address possible simultaneity problems with the
dependent variable. We follow the tradition in the trade literature of including countryspecific fixed effects (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Head and Ries, 2008; De Sousa and Lochard,
2011): they are particularly important as they capture, for example, the impact of other
location-specific environmental policies as long as they are time-invariant.23 Note that all the
We experimented with a richer set of fixed effects, including industry-by-location and time-by-location fixed
effects but the sample size impose excessive requirements on the data. Results are qualitatively similar.
23
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additive shifters to the investment profit that are not alternative-j specific, such as year-byfirm fixed effects, are implicitly controlled for. Since only differences in profits between
locations matter their contribution to profits are not identified. Equation (14) cannot be

directly estimated as 'JKL is not observed; only the final investment decisions are. Under the

assumption that the unobserved profit component is random with an Extreme Value type-I
distribution, we can use the conditional logit approach of McFadden (1973, 1975) originally
developed for random utility models.24 In this approach, each choice situation for each firm is
a separate observation. We can express the conditional probability of firm i at time t taking a
location decision j in the following way:
>JKL =

(14)

%&3x^pY y6z;{ Y 6|Y }

∑Yp %&3x^pY y6z;{ Y 6|Y }

and form the corresponding maximum likelihood as:
•d •
∏ƒ•
~ `, a, w = ∏„
J
K d ∏L •dd‚ >JKL

(15)

∗
€[YZ

where `, a and w are vectors of parameters to be estimated and ' ∗ is the investment choice as

defined in (8). Results from the maximum likelihood estimation are reported in Table 7.

Table 7: Multinomial logit estimates of the investment decision model
Probability of investing in j
\]JKL

(KL

(1)

(2)

(3)

-9.005***
(3.403)

JKL

-9.789***
(1.574)

……………
\]mKL

-0.551
(0.426)

24 This approach is also a natural generalization of the Poisson approach often used in the investment location
literature. Papers in that literature start from a similar behavioral model and aggregate the logit probabilities at
the country or country-industry level. Since aggregated logits distribute Poisson, estimation proceeds by Poisson
maximum likelihood, which is computationally advantageous because it reduces the dimensionality of the
problem. The drawback is that explicit within-industry heterogeneity, which is precisely the interest of the
present paper, is lost in the aggregation and can at most be recovered by strong distributional assumptions (i.e.
assuming that it is a random effect or parameter of a known distribution).
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Distance

-0.531∗∗∗

-0.531∗∗∗

-0.570∗∗∗

(0.148)

(0.060)

(0.060)

0.527∗∗∗

0.530∗∗∗

0.474∗∗

(0.242)

(0.145)

(0.142)

1.165∗∗∗

1.165∗∗∗

1.220∗∗∗

(0.248)

(0.090)

(0.086)

0.015∗∗∗

0.015∗∗∗

0.011∗∗∗

(0.016)

(0.003)

(0.003)

-2.234∗∗∗

-2.236∗∗∗

-2.278∗∗∗

(0.437)

(0.110)

(0.103)

0.147∗∗∗

0.148∗∗∗

0.115∗∗∗

(0.057)

(0.034)

(0.030)

No. observations

953598

953598

1031022

No. choices
No. firms
Location fixed effects

23285
4083
Yes

23285
4083
Yes

24624
4089
Yes

Shared language

GDP

GDP per capita

Exports

Incoming FDI

Notes: The table reports coefficients from a multinomial (conditional) logit
estimation. The dependent variable is the probability of investing in a certain
location. A negative coefficient means that higher values of the variable are
associated with a lower probability of investing. In round brackets blockbootstrapped (200 repetitions) standard error for model (1) and standard errors
clustered at the firm level for model (2) and (3). GDP, exports and FDI are logged
and expressed in M€; GDP per capita is in thousand €; distance in thousand
kilometers. Three (resp. two) asterisks indicate a significance with p < 0.001 (resp.
0.01).

Column 1 reports the results from the main specification. A negative coefficient of \]JKL is

associated with a lower probability for the firm to locate its investments within the EU ETS.

As a reminder, \]JKL is higher if the firm is more emission intensive or the allowance price is
higher and is lower if the free allowances allocated to the firm are lower. However, the

coefficients in the table cannot be directly interpreted. To give a sense of the results we can
compare the coefficient of

\]JKL to those of the other covariates. A standard deviation

increase from the mean in \]JKL is equal to a 28% increase in the emission expenditure on

revenues. Column 2 reports the results from a specification using as variable of interest only
(KL

∗
JKL , i.e. it ignores the measure estimated for JKL . The estimated coefficient is similar to that
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of \]JKL . This suggests that the expected compliance costs (KL

JKL

drive the result, while free

allowances bear less importance on the investment location decision. Column 3 repeats the

\]mKL , constructed using !…m , the median
exercise using an industry-wide measure for \]JKL , ……………

output elasticity to energy in an industry, instead of the firm-specific !J . This specification
mimics the problem of using industry aggregates instead of firm-specific values for emission

intensity. When firm heterogeneity is ignored, the estimated effects of carbon pricing on
investments are not statistically different from zero.
We note that the variable of interest

\]JKL is a generated regressor, so that standard

inference is invalid. A two-stage estimation procedure delivers consistent estimates, but the
standard errors need to be adjusted to take the first stage into account. We use a bootstrap
procedure to recover an empirical distribution of a which can be used for testing. To allow for

within-firm correlation of errors, we block-bootstrap at the firm level, constructing estimates
\]JKL † for each repetition r and re-estimating the model to obtain a † . Quantiles of a †

can be used to construct confidence intervals. The bootstrapped standard errors used here

are larger than the naive ones, e.g. ‡.ˆ .‰ffL a = 3.4, while ‡.ˆ .ŒiJ•% a = 1.5 for the model

in column (1).

6. Policy implications
To help appreciate the results presented above, especially the magnitude of the investments
diverted by carbon pricing, we consider here two policy exercises: (1) a higher price of carbon
resulting from a tighter initial supply of allowances; (2) no free allowances distributed to
firms.
Increase in the allowance price. We first consider the effects on investments of a tighter supply
of allowances leading to a constant price of €30 per allowance. The EU ETS allowance prices
have been lower than most estimates of the social cost of carbon, including the most
conservative ones.25 Arguably, this was caused by an excessive supply of allowances. To
address this problem, the carbon targets (and consequently the allowances supply) have been
progressively reduced and the allowance price has increased as a result. Here, we estimate

25

See Tol (2011) for a review.
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the capital and emissions that would have been displaced in the period 2005- 2012 by a
further increase in this price.
We model the price increase as a left shift of the allowances supply curve along the demand
curve. The average price of allowances over the period was €13.52.26 We consider an increase
to €30, equal to an average increase by 122%. Since supply is fixed in advance, it is a perfectly
inelastic curve. The other prices are held constant.27 For each firm, we predict the new
quantity of allowances demanded per unit of revenue using (8). We then predict the outcome

of the model using the new values for \]JKL . As a result of the price increase, the results
suggest that firms’ emission intensity would have decreased by 57%.28

Figure 2 shows the changes in investments implied by the model. The results are presented
respectively for the firms classified as not exempted from auctioning, the firms exempted
from auctioning and the not classified ones.29 The exempted firms are those deemed at risk of
carbon leakage by the regulation.

Figure 2: Effects on investments of an allowance price increase to €30

26

The lowest price was €0.72 in 2007, while the highest price was €22.67 in 2008.

27 Importantly, the price of energy is held fixed or, in other words, we implicitly assume no pass-through of higher

costs from energy producers to consumers. This assumption seems justified for fuels other than electricity since
producers are mostly located outside of the EU ETS. However, some pass-through can be expected for electricity
producers (Fabra and Reguant, 2014). If electricity prices increase because of pass-through, the effect estimated
here is underestimated for manufacturers and overestimated for energy producers.
This decrease is quite high and probably due to the linear extrapolation of the demand elasticities which
overestimates the reaction of the firm. To obviate this problem, we repeated the exercise keeping the emission
intensities fixed, modeling the price increase as a proportional upward shift of firms demand for allowances,
rather than a supply shift. The effect is an increase of the averted investments, as the expenditure share becomes
larger, but stays reasonably close to the results reported here.
28

The number of firms belonging to the three categories is 1,110, 1,730 and 1,362 respectively. See Appendix A
for details on this classification.
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Not classified

Emission intensity
Δ Investment (axis 2)
Probability change of investing in EU
Notes: Effects on investments of an allowance price increase to €30 over the period
2005-2012 for firms not exempted and exempted from auctioning and not
classified. The emission intensities reported are those associated with activity in
the lost investment. The probability change is the average decrease in the
probability the firm invests in the EU ETS area, conditional on investing
internationally.

The figure reports three values. The leftmost bar in each category shows the average
emission intensity associated with the lost investments. This calculated activity from exempted
firms is on average more polluting than those from not exempted firms, as expected from the
definition of exempted industries discussed in Section 2: their emission intensity is 25% higher.
The middle bar shows the change in the probability of investing in a EU country, conditional on
making any investment at all, averaged by category. The probability of investing decreases by
0.1 percentage points, more for not exempted firms (-0.14 percentage points) than for exempted
firms (-0.08). The right bar shows the aggregate loss in investments by category. An allowance
price increase to €30 is associated with an expected loss of investment of 443 M€. Of these,
108 million are due to not exempted firms and 134 million to exempted firms.
Zero free allowances. To evaluate the contribution of free allowance on investments we
consider a scenario in which firms do not receive free allowances. This is done by imposing
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∗
JKL

= 0 when calculating \]JKL . We then predict the investments implied by the model in this

case and compare the result with the baseline data. Figure 3 shows the results.

0.5

100

0.25

50

0

0

-0.25

Euros million

Percentage points

Figure 3: Effects on investments reducing to zero the free allowances

-50

-0.5

-100

Not exempted

Exempted

Not classified

Emission intensity
Δ Investment (axis 2)
Probability change of investing in EU
Notes: Effects on investments reducing to zero the free allowances, over the period
2005-2012 for firms not exempted and exempted from auctioning and not
classified. The emission intensities reported are those associated with activity in
the lost investment. The probability change is the average decrease in the
probability the firm invests in the EU ETS area, conditional on investing
internationally.

The emission intensities of the investments are 26% higher for exempted firms than for not
exempted firms. Reducing free allowances to zero has a small and very similar effect on the
probability of investing in the EU for both categories of firms (-0.2 percentage points). These
two measures should be implicitly targeted by the classification rules into exempted and not
exempted firms. To be efficient, compensations should target those firms that have more
elastic investments to carbon pricing and have more emission intensive investments (Martin
et al., 2014b). Even ignoring the magnitude of the effects in place, this exercise shows that the
classification criterion fails on the first objective and only partially succeeds on the second.
The rightmost column for each category in the graph shows the effect on the expected
32
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investments in the EU ETS area. Reducing to zero the free allowances is associated with an
expected loss of 73 M€, equal to a -0.17% reduction in investments in the area with respect
to the full sample. To give an idea of the magnitude of this loss with respect to the
compensation scheme, the free allowances distributed over the period were around 2 billion
per year, with an average allowance price of €13.52. Although not all these allowances were
handed as compensation, the associated retained investments are remarkably small.

7. Robustness checks
An assumption of the model is that current prices are a good reflection of the firm’s
expectation on future prices. On this basis, one-period profits represented a good proxy for
net present profits. Firms might, however, anticipate future events that are not captured by
current prices. This fact is especially problematic if this happens for the allowance price (L as

this is a key component of the variable of interest, \]JKL . To take explicitly into account this

problem we look at future contract data for the EUAs.30 These future contracts can be used by

the firm to insure against future fluctuations in the allowance price. Their price can therefore
be interpreted as the market’s expectation. These prices correlate very strongly with the
allowances spot price, suggesting that the latter incorporates fairly well expectations.31
To formally test the role of expectations for the investment location decision, we calculated
the expected compliance costs from carbon pricing using the price of the future contracts.
\]JKL6

Denote with

these costs where s = {1,…,5} represent a delivery date 1 to 5 years

ahead. Results are presented in Column 1 of Table 8.

Table 8: Robustness checks
Probability of investing in j

\]JKL

\]JKL6

30

(1)

(2)

-9.575∗∗∗

-6.707∗∗∗

(1.482)

(1.287)

(3)

0.385

EEX CFI ICE future contract data. Source: Thomson Reuters.

One relevant exception are future contracts on allowances for the second phase of the EU ETS, exchanged
during the first phase. Because bankability was not allowed between those two phases, the two underlying assets
were factually different.
31
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\]JKL6
\]JKL6
\]JKL6
\]JKL6

\]JKL × Phase I

(0.394)
-0.094
(0.670)
10.44
(14.021)
-12.89
(25.406)
2.251
(11.700)
-4.875∗∗
(1.698)
-13.77∗∗∗

\]JKL × Phase II

(2.167)
4.884∗∗∗
(0.072)

Past investment in j
N

953598

953598

953598

Choices
Firms
Location fixed effects

23285
4083
Yes
Yes

23285
4083
Yes
Yes

23285
4083
Yes
Yes

Covariates (^K )

Notes: The table reports coefficients from a multinomial (conditional) logit
estimation. The dependent variable is the probability of investing in a certain
location. Standard errors clustered at the firm level for model in columns (2) and
(3) in parentheses. Three (resp. two) asterisks indicate a significance with p < 0.001
(resp. 0.01).

Column 1 of the table shows that the main result is not affected and none of these variables
are statistically significant. This is because of the strong correlation between the future
contract prices and the spot price.
A second assumption of the model was that the investment decision is memory-less. In
particular, the firm that decides where to locate its investment does not take into account
whether or not it has invested in the same country in the past. This fact potentially ignores
congestion or agglomeration effects as well as an unobserved preference of the firm for that
country. To address this problem, we add a dummy variable that captures whether the firm
has invested in the country before. Column 2 in Table 10 shows that the coefficient for this
variable takes on a positive and significant value, suggesting either agglomeration effects or
34
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unobserved time-persistent preference of the firm for the country. The coefficient for
\]JKL decreases a little, thus not affecting the results discussed so far.

Finally, we consider a more flexible specification for a, allowing it to vary over the two EU ETS

trading periods considered in this paper. We do so by interacting the variable \]JKL with a

dummy variable for the second phase. Recall that the two phases had slightly different rules,
as discussed in Section 2. Moreover, during the second phase the European Commission
reinforced its intention to continue and strengthen the carbon pricing scheme. Column 3 in

Table 6 shows results in line with this interpretation, with a coefficient for \]JKL in the second
phase larger than that of the first phase.

6. Summary and Conclusion
The risk of carbon leakage contributes to timid climate change policies. The fear of hampering
risk competitiveness with a strict regulation is compounded by that of falling short of reducing
global emissions. Compensations in the form of free allowances are an attractive economic
instrument to address this problem, because they do not hinder their efficient final allocation.
But mostly important, they are politically appealing as they demand no disbursement by
firms. Therefore, generous compensations schemes have been adopted in most carbon pricing
schemes, without a critical assessment of whether they were effective, or needed.
In this paper we have provided this assessment by estimating the effect of the EU carbon
pricing on international investments. To this end, we have used detailed data on firm-level
emissions and investment decisions.
Absent detailed firm-level information, both academic research and policy makers have relied
on industry-wide aggregates for evaluating carbon leakage and select the firms to
compensate. This paper has taken a different approach, on the ground that firms are very
heterogeneous within industries in their emission intensities. We exploited the data richness
available for firms under the EU ETS and a novel dataset on greenfield investments to provide
a finer characterization of the firms’ emission patterns in relation with their investment
location decisions. We have argued that the emissions from the investing company can be
used to infer the expected compliance costs of the investment due to carbon pricing. We have
used these estimated compliance costs in a model of investment location decisions to evaluate
the effect of the EU ETS on the probability of firms to invest within Europe.
35
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The expected compliance costs are not observed. The emissions of the parent company could
be used to proxy for them, but those emissions are naturally endogenous to allowance prices.
To address this issue, we have leveraged a theoretical model of the firm’s production choices,
which delivers an estimable condition between emissions and allowance and energy prices.
We showed that a key determinant of this condition is the output elasticity to energy: a
technological parameter that can be estimated from the first order condition of the firm. If the
investing firm and the new plant share this same technology, this parameter can be used as
the basis to infer the emission intensity of the new investment.
The findings point in the direction of a statistical effect of carbon pricing on investment
location decisions. Interestingly, this effect disappears when we used industry aggregates
instead of firm-level measures, reinforcing this paper’s argument on the importance of firms’
heterogeneity. However, we show that this effect is economically small. For example, an
increase in the price of carbon to €30 is associated with a loss of 443 M€ over 7 years, or a
reduction of -0.9%. Similarly, we show that the allocation of free allowances has contributed
to attract 79 M€ in investments, vis-à-vis a very generous scheme.
We also provide evidence that the EU ETS classification rule for compensated firms misses
partially its objective. Compensated firms are not more nor less respondent to carbon pricing
than non-compensated firms, despite the fact that targeting more elastic firms would help
reducing the size of the compensation scheme.
This paper contributes to the policy discussion on carbon markets in several ways. First, it
stresses the importance of micro data for evaluating them and provides an easily
generalizable framework to treat them. Second, it puts in perspective the risk of carbon
leakage: it does not dismiss the possibility that firms react to environmental policies locating
activity elsewhere, but it suggests that this is a more remote possibility than previous
evidence suggested. Finally, it provides a basis to discuss the future of compensation schemes
for carbon leakage, not only in the EU ETS, which has entered its fourth phase, but also in
other carbon markets over the world.
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Appendix
A. Firms at risk of carbon leakage
Precise information on whether a firm receives compensation for carbon leakage is not readily
available. To obtain it, we consider the observed allocation of free allowances in conjunction with
the regulation. The regulation states that the free allocation is to be progressively phased out. To that
end, a linear reduction factor is applied every year from 2013 to the starting value of allocated
allowances. On the other hand, no reduction factor is applied to protected firms. In practice, the free
allowances have been reduced by -10.5% in non-protected industries, with small differences across
industries due to the definition of industry benchmarks. Protected industries have experienced a
reduction of about -1.7%. Since the difference is quite sharp, it is possible to use the free allowance data
from 2013 to classify firms in one of the two categories by looking at the reduction in free allowances.
We classify as “not exempted” (from auctioning) those firms that have experienced a reduction in free
allowances between -8% and -13% and as “exempted” those firms that have experienced a reduction
between -1% and -3%. Firms that undergo substantial changes in capacity, either increasing it or
decreasing it, are allocated a different amount of allowances. When this happens for more than one year
we opt for the most conservative approach and do not classify them. Table A.1 shows the number of
firms ever active in the EU ETS and their classification, as well as the sum of associated emissions and
allowances for three selected years.
It is possible to use this classification to estimate what amount of the free allowances is left as
compensation, by calculating what the allowances would have been, if the reduction factor would have
been increased equally for exempted and not-exempted firms. W e take free allowances of exempted
firms and apply the same reduction factor that applies to non exempted firms. This is done in Table A.2.

Table A.1: Classification of firms by risk of carbon leakage according to the EU ETS definition
Classification

No. firms

Emissions (%)

Free allocations

2005

Not classified
Not exempted
Exempted

1723
1370
2069

25%
40%
35%

425
782
723

2009

Not classified
Not exempted
Exempted

1607
1586
2421

23%
40%
37%

356
659
782

2012

Not classified
Not exempted

1425
1674

22%
41%

374
711

Year
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2017

Exempted

2493

37%

810

Not classified
Not exempted
Exempted

730
1803
2988

18%
40%
42%

19
115
598

Notes: Classification of firms by risk of carbon leakage according to the EU ETS definition.
The classification is based on the observed changes in the free allowances allocation
between the years from 2013 to 2017. All firms for which a match in Orbis was found are
included. Emissions in percentage; free allocations in millions

Table A.2: Estimated compensations for carbon leakage in million EUAs
Free Allowances
Year

Current

Reduced

Difference

Market Value

663
643
626
620
598

594
515
449
398

49
112
171
201

290
856
972
1171

2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Notes: Estimated compensations for carbon leakage in million EUAs. The estimates are
obtained by comparing the current free allowances obtained by firms protected from
carbon leakage and applying the same reduction factor of the non protected firms. The
market value is calculated multiplying the estimated difference by the spot price of EUAs and
is expressed in M€.

B. Model derivations
B.1 Cost minimizing choice of energy sources and the firm’s emission choice
We begin by considering the firm’s choice of individual energy sources that minimizes total energy
costs. To produce the aggregate energy input E the firm solves the following problem:
(B.1)

min ∑

% ,…,%/

$% + ("

s.t.

∑

Exponentiating both sides of the constraint in (B.1) to the power of

≥
without loss of generality,

we form the Lagrangean:
(B.2)

ℒ=∑

$% + ("

The first order condition with respect to
(B.3)

$% + (" = a

+a

−∑

for each s = 1,…, S is:
D
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Let $2 =

345 6784
94

(B.4)

and solve (B.3) for

:
32
z

= x 4}

B

Substitute (B.4) in the constraint of problem (B.1) to get:

(B.5)

=’

∑/4“ 94 324 B
z

B

”

Substituting the S first order conditions (B.3) into the objective function of problem (B.1) and using
the definition of $2 yields the cost function:

(B.6)

# a =

∑/4“ 94 324 B
z

B

To eliminate the Lagrange multiplier a we solve (B.5) for a

B

= A∑
;

$2

B

C and use it into

(B.6) to get a cost function that depends on the amount of total energy E used in production:

(B.7)

#• $% , (, ; ,

=

A∑

$2

B

C

B

The unit cost of energy #• depends on the price vector of energy sources $% , the carbon price (, and

the vector

collecting the parameters

and . By Shephard’s lemma we obtain from (B.7) the

conditional demand function for each energy source

(B.8)

=

:

324 B

–∑/4“ 94 324 B —

Total carbon emissions CE are given by the sum of emissions produced from the different energy
sources, according to their carbon content. Using (B.8):

(B.9)

# =∑

"

=

∑/4“ 84 324 B

–∑/4“ 94 324 B —

Finally, using (B.9) we can express the energy cost function (B.7) in terms of emissions:
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# $ , (, # ; ,

(B.10)

Expression > $% , (; ,

= # ∙ EA∑

= # ∙ > $ , (; ,

%

%

$2

C A∑

B

" $2

B

D

C F

is the per-emission cost sustained by the firm to produce one additional unit

of energy. Equations (B.9) and (B.10) allow us to write the firm’s profit maximization problem in terms
of emission choices rather than energy source choices.

B.2 Comparative statics of emission intensity
We now compute the effect of a change in the price of individual energy sources on emission intensity
e. From equations (7) and (11) in the main text we have:
=

(B.11)

˜

= !™

35 ,7;9,

We now differentiate e with respect to $% , that is:
›%
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(B.13)

›%
›345

≥0

⟺

345
84

+( ≥ ∑

¢

p•

35p
4

84 p

+ (£

The emission intensity e increases with an increase in price of the energy source $% if the price is

relatively low or its carbon content " is relatively high, when compared to the other energy sources.
For example, for

= 1 – the limiting case of perfectly substitutable energy source – the condition can

be expressed by the following weighted average:
Section 3.2 of the main text.

345
84

≥∑

p•

¢

35p
4

84 p

£, which motivates the argument in

C. Unobserved emission intensities and free allowances
Consider firms that invest exclusively outside or inside the regulated area in a given year. The emission
intensity of the former (3.7 tons per thousand euros sales) is on average 60% higher than the latter
(1.9 tons per thousand euros sales). Within- industry comparisons provide the same result, as firms
that invest outside of the EU ETS are on average more emission intensive in 26 out of 33 industries.
This difference is in line with the theoretical model, which suggests that emission intensive firms have,
everything else equal, a higher incentive to invest outside of regulated countries. This effect could be
offset by free allowances, which aim at keeping investments within the EU ETS area. Indeed, firms that
invest outside of the EU ETS also receive more free allowances to cover the emissions they produce
domestically. On average, they receive 2.6 free allowances per thousand euros sales, while the firms
that invest within the EU ETS receive 1.7 free allowances per thousand euros sales. As a statistical test,
we use a logit regression where we consider the firms investing only outside of the EU ETS regulated
area in a given year against the firms investing only inside of it. Table C.1 reports the results.

Table C.1: Test of difference between firms investing
outside of the EU ETS from those investing inside

Emissions per sales

JdL

Free allowances per sales
Constant

∗
JdL

Observations

coefficient

Standard
error

0.055

(0.028)

-0.051

(0.030)

-0.652

(0.117)
335

Both coefficients are statistically significant at a 90% confidence level (p-values: 0.051 and 0.090
respectively). This means that firms that invest outside of the EU ETS emit more and receive less free
allowances, after controlling for their emitting level. The signs of this correlation do not change when
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conditioned on the country of origin, the year or a measure of the firm size. Moreover, the difference
between the two groups in

JKL

remains always significant at a 90% confidence interval.

D. Missing data on energy prices
Energy prices data presents some missing values, especially concentrated in the price of coal. To
address the problem, we estimate the following models:
$%KL = §dK + § K $%KLD + ¨ _KL §• + © L + ª

(D.1)

KL

where $%KL are the energy prices of the four energy sources considered (oil, gas, electricity, coal) in
country j and year t, ©

L

are year fixed effects and ª

KL

is an iid error. The vector ¨ KL contains

observable variables that can help predict the price of energy sources: the price of the same source
available for energy producers or household consumers; the price of a similar source in the same
category in the country (e.g. low sulfur oil prices for fuel oil); an industrial price index for the same
source (provided by the IEA); the commodity price in the closest international market (e.g. Brent or
WTI oil prices, Australian coal price); the IEA import price in Europe for coal net of insurance and
freight costs. In addition, for coal we use data from neighboring countries for Czech Republic,
Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Norway. The predicted values from model (C.1) are used
to impute the missing data described in Section 4.

E. Model selection and cross validation
The model has been selected through k-class cross validation (k = 301). Cross validation aims at
reducing the risk of overfitting non-parametric models trading off bias and variance of the nonparametric estimation. Let z be a “hyper-parameter” vector describing fully the competing models.
As we restrict here attention to second-order polynomial approximations, z is a vector of length 20

that contains 0’s and 1’s which determining what covariates from the polynomial $ « are fit to the
data. That is:
(E.1)

-®

•
$ « = ¬(KL , x$fJgKL } , … , (KL
-

%

-¯

%
, … , (KL ∙ $fJgKL

-

%
, … , $hi

-®°
%
±
KL ∙$8figKL

so that when, for example, z = {1,1,1,1,1,0,…,0}, only the linear prices are used as independent
variables.
We select the model that minimizes the following means squared error, operating a supervised
search over possible values of z:
(E.2)

²]

« =

„{

∑„
∑{L ³úJL « − ´JL µ•
J
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where úJL « is the value of y predicted by the model with hyper-parameter z. The mean squared error

is the sum of two components: an estimation of the bias ³úJL « µ − ´JL , which is decreasing with the
order of polynomial approximation, and a variance term,

úJL « − ³úJL « µ

•

increasing with it.

Minimizing this objective represents a good trade-off between the two.

¶ « using k-class cross validation. For each competing model z the
We obtain estimates of ²]

algorithm works as follows: (1) the sample is divided into k “validation classes” composed of the same

number of firms; (2) the first validation class is taken out and the model is estimated on the remaining

¶ « is estimated; (4) the process is repeated for all k classes. Taking averages
classes; (3) the ²]

¶ « = ∑m ²]
¶m « .
across the classes we obtain the estimate ²]
m

The method is bound by computational times. In view of this we first limit attention to 301 classes,
instead of resorting to leave-one-out cross validation (leave-one-out cross validation – LOOCV - is a
specialization of k-class cross validation with k = N, which is more thorough but also more
computationally intensive), where 301 has been chosen to be reasonably big while being a (near)
round divisor of sample size. Second, it is impossible to check all the 220 combinations for a second
order polynomial. Thus, we consider only models containing all linear parameters inside as we have a
direct interest in them. Then we proceed by addition, nesting each model in the previous one. This
precaution excludes, for example, models with only interactions but not squared terms. Instead of
1,048,576, we compare (only) 13 models. Finally, the cross validation has been performed on two
models: the “basic” one with only firm fixed effects and the one with industry-specific elasticities and
firm fixed effects. In the end we base the final decision on the results obtained for the former for two
reasons. First and foremost, because of some of the failed sub-sampling attempts in the case with
industry-specific elasticities, due to the presence of relatively few observations for some industries.
Second, because we use the former specification as a base for the following analysis, we consider it the
predominant one. The next table E.1 presents the estimates for the ²]

« for the 13 models

considered. The model finally selected (model 10 in the table) contains: the linear prices, their square,
the interaction of carbon price with all the other energy prices, and the interaction of oil prices with
electricity and gas prices.
Table E.1: Cross validated mean squared errors
k

²]

«

1

14612.91

2

14613.37

3

14562.17
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4

14543.81

5

14544.22

6

14461.89

7

14423.01

8

14423.53

9

14420.42

10

14419.88

11

14420.94

12

14421.44

13

14421.40

F. Calculation of expected compliance costs
Section 5.3 in the main text describes how emissions were estimated: see equation (12). To measure
the precision of the estimates we employ a bootstrap procedure. Using asymptotic theory to
construct tests is in principle feasible, since we have the estimated variance-covariance matrix of
the coefficients from (10), but it is not advisable. Since the fixed effects are identified only by within
variations and the panel is short, the bootstrap is better suited for small sample testing. We thus
randomly resample the data in “blocks” in which each firm i has equal probability of being chosen.
Resampled data are constituted of the selected is and all its associated observations. We then
estimate ̂JKL † using equation (12) where r indexes one of 200 repetitions. From the distribution of

estimated values, we can construct bootstrapped confidence intervals by taking the corresponding
percentiles. We use the 5th and 95th percentile, $̂ 5

JKL

and $̂ 95

JKL ,

to obtain a 90% confidence

interval. Letting ¹ be the number of repetitions the firm appears in, the standard deviation of tJKL †

can be estimated using the expression ‡̂JKL = º ¹ − 1

D

•
∑ b tJKL † − tJKL c »

/•

. To be able to

compare different firms, we consider a normalized confidence interval ¹#¼JKL in the following way:
(F.1)

¹#¼JKL =

%̂ [YZ D3u ‚ [YZ 3u ½‚ [YZ D%̂ [YZ
,
̂ [YZ
̂[YZ

It is worth noting that 58.1% of the estimated emissions are significantly different from zero, i.e. 0 ∉

¹#¼JKL . Across the sample, the average lower bound of the confidence interval is equal to 0.93 standard

deviations and the average upper bound of the confidence interval is equal to 0.157 standard
deviations (three firms active in the transport sector have been excluded from this and subsequent
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analysis because their bounds were unreasonably large). This means that the model is more imprecise
when predicting positive deviations from the mean rather than negative.

Using estimated net emissions, we compute expected compliance costs per unit of revenue \]JKL =
(KL

JKL

−

∗
JKL

. Variation in \]JKL drives identification of the effect of carbon pricing on investments.

Since it is a constructed variable, it is important to know where this variation comes from. We
therefore present an analysis of variance (ANOVA) in Table F.1 along three dimensions: the country
where the investment is directed j, the year t, and the industry k. The first two dimensions capture the
effect of local energy and allowance price on the cost for emissions, while the third one captures all
between-industry difference. The part of the \]JKL that is left unexplained is due to variations in !J

which are not explained by industry differences.

Table F.1: Analysis of variance of ¿ÀÁÂÃÄ
Source

SS

df

6115

7217

MS

F

p-value

0.847

13.58

0.000

SS/SST OT
9.8 %

50.72
154.32
21.84
24
3.03
12.69
3.33

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.2 %
0.3 %
0.0 %
2.1 %
0.1 %
0.2 %
1.9 %

Model
j
k
t
jxk
jxt
t ×k
jxkxt
Residual

130
212
10
1 328
54
115
1212

41
22
7
887
287
145
5828

3.164
9.627
1.362
1.497
0.189
0.792
0.208

56511

905868

0.062

90.2 %

Total

62626

913085

0.069

100.0 %

Notes: The table reports the sum of squares (SS), the degrees of freedom (df), the mean
squares (MS), F-ratios (F), p-values and the ratio of the sum of squares for that variable
divided by the total sum of squares (SS/SSTOT). This last element is the percentage of variance
in \]JKL due to the explanatory variables listed in the first column.

Even after taking into account differences between industries, more than 90% of the variation is due
to between-firm differences. This fact makes evident that the results of the estimated location decision
model of section 5.4 are mostly driven by idiosyncratic differences between firms which cannot be
explained by resorting to industry comparisons alone.

50

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1382

52

Galeotti and D'Arcangelo:
Policy
and Investment
Location: The Risk of Ca
FONDAZIONEEnvironmental
ENI ENRICO MATTEI
WORKING
PAPER SERIES
“NOTE DI LAVORO”
Our Working Papers are available on the Internet at the following address:
https://www.feem.it/pubblicazioni/feem-working-papers/
“NOTE DI LAVORO” PUBLISHED IN 2022
1. 2022, Daniele Crotti, Elena Maggi, Evangelia Pantelaki, Urban cycling tourism. How can bikes and
public transport ride together for sustainability?
2. 2022, Antonio Acconcia, Sergio Beraldo, Carlo Capuano, Marco Stimolo, Public subsidies and
cooperation in research and development. Evidence from the lab
3. 2022, Jia Meng, ZhongXiang Zhang, Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure and Investor
Response: Empirical Evidence from China's Capital Market
4. 2022, Mariagrazia D'Angeli, Giovanni Marin, Elena Paglialunga, Climate Change, Armed Conflicts and
Resilience
5. 2022, Davide Antonioli, Claudia Ghisetti, Massimiliano Mazzanti, Francesco Nicolli, The economic
returns of circular economy practices
6. 2022, Massimiliano Mazzanti, Francesco Nicolli, Stefano Pareglio, Marco Quatrosi, Adoption of Eco
and Circular Economy-Innovation in Italy: exploring different firm profiles
7. 2022, Davide Antonioli, Claudia Ghisetti, Stefano Pareglio, Marco Quatrosi, Innovation, Circular
economy practices and organisational settings: empirical evidence from Italy
8. 2022, Ilenia Romani, Marzio Galeotti, Alessandro Lanza, Besides promising economic growth, will the
Italian NRRP also produce fewer emissions?
9. 2022, Emanuele Ciola, Enrico Turco, Andrea Gurgone, Davide Bazzana, Sergio Vergalli, Francesco
Menoncin, Charging the macroeconomy with an energy sector: an agent-based model
10. 2022, Emanuele Millemaci, Alessandra Patti, Nemo propheta in Patria: Empirical Evidence from Italy
11. 2022, Daniele Valenti, Andrea Bastianin, Matteo Manera, A weekly structural VAR model of the US
crude oil market
12. 2022, Banchongsan Charoensook, On Efficiency and Stability in Two-way Flow Network with Small
Decay: A note
13. 2022, Shu Guo, ZhongXiang Zhang, Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence from
Chinese listed companies
14. 2022, Filippo Bontadini, Francesco Vona, Anatomy of Green Specialisation: Evidence from EU
Production Data, 1995-2015
15. 2022, Mattia Guerini, Fabio Vanni, Mauro Napoletano, E pluribus, quaedam. Gross domestic product
out of a dashboard of indicators
16. 2022, Cinzia Bonaldo, Fulvio Fontini, Michele Moretto, The Energy Transition and the Value of
Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms
17. 2022, Giovanni Marin, Francesco Vona, Finance and the Reallocation of Scientiﬁc, Engineering and
Mathematical Talent
18. 2022, Anna Laura Baraldi, Erasmo Papagni, Marco Stimolo, Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized
Crime. Assessment of Anti-Crime Measure in Fighting Mafia Violence
19. 2022, Alexander Golub, Jon Anda, Anil Markandya, Michael Brody, Aldin Celovic, Angele Kedaitiene,
Climate alpha and the global capital market
20. 2022, Jlenia Di Noia, Agent-Based Models for Climate Change Adaptation in Coastal Zones. A Review
21. 2022, Alberto Gabino Martínez-Hernández, System Dynamics modelling and Climate Change
Adaptation in Coastal Areas: A literature review
22. 2022, Pietro De Ponti, Matteo Romagnoli, Financial Implications of the EU Emission Trading System: an
analysis of wavelet coherence and volatility spillovers
23. 2022, Laura Cavalli, Mia Alibegovic, Davide Vaccari, Andrea Spasiano, Fernando Nardi, Sustainability
assessment of the public interventions supported by the ReSTART project in the CITI4GREEN
framework
24. 2022, Filippo Maria D'Arcangelo, Giulia Pavan, Sara Calligaris, The Impact of the European Carbon
Market on Firm Productivity: Evidence from Italian Manufacturing Firms.
25. 2022, Enrico Turco, Davide Bazzana, Massimiliano Rizzati, Emanuele Ciola, Sergio Vergalli, Energy prices
shocks and macroeconomic stabilization policies in the MATRIX model
26. 2022, Mario Gilli, Filippo Giorgini, Citizens Protests: causes and consequences. A Research on Regime
Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

53

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1382 [2022]

“NOTE DI LAVORO” PUBLISHED IN 2022

27. 2022, Filippo Maria D'Arcangelo, Marzio Galeotti, Environmental Policy and Investment Location: The
Risk of Carbon Leakage in the EU ETS

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1382

54

Galeotti and D'Arcangelo: Environmental Policy and Investment Location: The Risk of Ca

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta 63, Milano – Italia
Tel. +39 02 403 36934
E-mail: letter@feem.it
www.feem.it

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

55

